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PLACE OF TRIAL - INTERSTATE APPLICATION 
OF INTRASTATE METHODS OF ADJUSTMENT 
A N earlier article 1 describes the mischievous consequences of 
Ad determining the state of trial according to the nature of ac- 
tions and of permitting suits on transitory actions wherever the 
defendant may be " found," and traces various attempts to escape 
these consequences by statutory and constitutional limitations on 
jurisdiction, by rules of construction, and by statutes and injunc- 
tions against exporting suits. There is a certain fascination in 
following a number of channels of legal development each with its 
separate history but with a common direction given to all of them 
by pressure to meet some practical end. In this instance investi- 
gation revealed no satisfactory way out. Attempts to meet trial 
convenience by warping the concept of " finding " the defendant 
have resulted in much subtlety of reasoning, but this process is 
too cumbersome to correct any but the most extreme abuses. At- 
tempts to restrain the exportation of suits have proved, if any- 
thing, less successful. 
So much painful struggle and so little accomplishment suggests 
the need of a bolder approach which would completely discard the 
doctrine of permitting suit wherever the defendant may be found. 
The question of the proper place of trial is essentially administra- 
tive in character, like the question of time which arises upon a 
motion for continuance. It should be dealt with in the same way. 
The court should be free to decide according to the circumstances 
of the case with a view to giving each party a reasonably fair op- 
portunity to present his proof. Intricate metaphysical reasoning 
as to the nature of actions and dogma as to jurisdiction should not 
be allowed to obscure this simple practical issue. The natural 
place to raise this issue is in the court where the plaintiff has begun 
his action. This article is concerned with the question as it arises 
in this way. 
I 
The purely administrative aspects of the problem will emerge 
more clearly if we turn from the interstate to the intrastate field. 
1 Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions (I930) 43 HARV. L. REV. I2I7. 
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Considerations affecting the choice of state may be classified with 
reference to (i) ease of access by the parties with their proof; 
(2) differences in the probable reaction of the alternative forums 
to the same proofs; (3) enforceability of a judgment if obtained. 
The first two have close analogies in the problem of choosing the 
county. It is true that here the smaller scale of distances involved 
- hundreds rather than thousands of miles - may seem to make 
mere geographical location relatively unimportant. But the most 
relevant comparison is to the situation at the period when the 
intrastate rules were in their formative stage, a time when diffi- 
culties of transportation were such as to make the burden of a 
one hundred mile journey comparable to that of a thousand mile 
journey today. Hence there is really a close analogy to the practi- 
cal problems involved in current determination of the proper state. 
Again, while there are no differences in the substantive or pro- 
cedural rules to be applied in different counties, there are usually 
differences in trial terms and calendar conditions which will make 
trial more prompt in one than in another. Subtle intuitions as to 
the turn of mind of Judge X who will hear in the case in county A 
as contrasted with that of Judge Y in county B, as to differing 
attitudes of urban and rural jurors, and as to currents of popular 
feeling, may combine to make the choice of county a vital point in 
trial strategy. 
The third phase of the interstate problem - enforceability of 
the ensuing judgment - has no counterpart within the state. 
This makes it possible to select the county solely with a view to 
its propriety as a place for trial, without any complications com- 
parable to the questions of jurisdiction which cumber the choice of 
states. The result is to make the intrastate law a possible concrete 
example of the end toward which private international law should 
strive - the same degree of interstate cooperation in the adminis- 
tration of justice as would be practiced between different depart- 
ments of a single judicial system. 
There is nothing new about applying on a wider scale the rules 
worked out for determining the county. It is thence that comes 
our dogma about local and transitory actions and most of the worst 
mischief in the law as to the state of trial. The difficulty is that the 
borrowing was uncritical, superficial, and conceptual. A system of 
procedure is like a machine. An understanding of its broader 
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functions and the relations of the parts to each other is a prereq- 
uisite to successful adaptation to a different field. Slavish imita- 
tion of a part of the model without its counterbalances is bound 
to prove unsuccessful. The obvious failings of the doctrine of 
local and transitory action in the interstate field invite a re- 
examination of the original to see whether some essential check has 
been overlooked. 
Numerous standard works 2 trace the relation between the rules 
of venue and the development of jury trial, and show how the f act- 
reporting function of the jury originally made it inevitable that the 
jurors come from the place where the facts at issue arose, thus 
making all actions local; how this fitted in with and compelled 
a system of pleading designed to bring the parties to a single and 
narrow issue; how the requirement of a local venue gradually re- 
laxed with the change of the jury to a fact-trying body; how the 
changes took place with the minimum modification in forms, as 
certain allegations, which once had to be true, became fictitious; 
how the distinction between local and transitory actions came to 
turn on whether the court would permit the allegation that a 
particular event happened in one place, to wit in a totally different 
place,' and how this left the plaintiff with the prima facie power 
of designating any county in England as the place for trial of a 
transitory action. 
The plaintiff's power of determining the venue was abused.4 
The successive attempts to restrict its exercise indicate that-then as 
now there was temptation to choose the most inconvenient place 
for the defendant whether or not it was convenient for the plain- 
tiff. A statute of Richard II 5 attempted unsuccessfully to curb 
2 See STEPHEN, PLEADING (i895) * 3I5-28; THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON 
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (i898) C. II; 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENG- 
LISH LAW (I923) 654; 5 id. II7-I9, I40-42; TIDD, PRACTICE (ist ed. i796) I0- 
I3; SCOTr, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE (I922) i8-23. 
3 Sir Frederick Pollock has parodied the well known case of Mostyn v. Fa- 
brigas, I Cowp. i6i (1774), in his LEADING CASES DONE INTO ENGLISH (I892) 22: 
"Minorca lies in the Middle Sea, 
Within the ward of Cheap to wit." 
4 See 5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW II7. 
5 " To the intent that writs of debt and accompt, and all other such actions, 
be from henceforth taken in their counties, and directed to the sheriffs of the coun- 
ties where the contracts of the same actions did rise; (2) it is ordained and ac- 
corded, That if from henceforth in pleas upon the same writs it shall be declared, 
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the growth of fictions and keep the venue local. A statute of Henry 
IV 6 directed that attorneys be sworn that " they make no suit in 
a foreign county." Various rules of court called for punishment of 
attorneys for doing so.7 There was a brief period in which the de- 
fendant was permitted to take issue on allegations of venue. This 
made for delay.8 Finally, the practice developed of allowing mo- 
tions to change the venue originally selected by the plaintiff. A 
stereotyped motion calculated to take care of the clearly vexatious 
cases dates from early in the seventeenth century.' It was avail- 
able where the cause arose exclusively in one county and the plain- 
tiff had designated another. The plaintiff could prevent the change 
or change the venue back 10 by undertaking to give material evi- 
dence arising in the county where he had laid it. If he failed to 
make good his undertaking he would be nonsuited. 
Later we find the common law courts exercising a discretionary 
power to change the venue for the convenience of witnesses, in 
situations where the usual stereotyped motion would not apply. A 
good illustration of the practice is Holmes v. Wainwright.1" The 
defendant obtained a rule nisi to change the venue from London to 
Yorkshire upon affidavit that all the witnesses lived in Yorkshire. 
The plaintiff showed that a particular fact arose in London. On 
the defendant's agreeing to admit this fact the rule was made 
That the contract thereof was made in another county than is contained in the 
original writ, that then incontinently the same writ shall be utterly abated." 
6 RICH. II, C. 2 (1382). 
6 4 HEN. IV, C. i8 (1402). 
7 Tidd cites Michaelmas Rules i654 ? 5, K. B.; id. i654 ? 8, C. P.; id. I5 Eliz. 
? I5, C. P. Statements made in the balance of this paragraph are based on the 
chapter in TID, PRACTICE entitled Change of Venue. Since both chapter and 
page numbers vary in every edition consulted, no attempt will be made at more 
precise reference. 
8 For a while the practice was to examine plaintiff on oath, later to try the 
issue to the country. 
9 Tidd says that Lord Holt dated the origin from the time of James I. He 
cites TRYE, Jus FILIZARII 23I (i630), as giving the fee imposed for it. The form 
of affidavit as it became settled in the time of Charles I is: " the plaintiff's cause 
of action (if any) arose in the county of A, and not in the county of B, or else- 
where out of the county of A." 
10 In the King's Bench the practice was to grant a rule absolute in the first 
instance upon the defendant's making the motion in due form. In the Common 
Pleas the result was only a rule nisi. 
11 3 East 328 (i803). 
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absolute. Other cases emphasize the large discretion in the court 
to condition the granting of the motion on the defendant's aban- 
donment of some of his technical legal rights; to require an under- 
taking to give judgment as of a particular term; 12 to require a 
precise showing of the number of witnesses and the nature of the 
defense; 13 to require the defendant in an action on a bond to with- 
draw his plea of the general issue and go to trial on another plea 
characterized as on the merits."4 The defendant had the burden 
of overcoming the inertia of the court, and where his witnesses 
lived in one county and plaintiff's in another, so that convenience 
was equally balanced, the plaintiff's convenience would prevail."5 
The modern English practice provides for fixing the place of 
trial in every action by the court or judge with " regard to the 
convenience of the parties and their witnesses and the date at 
which the trial can take place, and when a view may be desirable 
the locality of the object to be viewed; and to the other circum- 
stances of the case, including (inter alia) the wishes of and expense 
to the parties, the relative facilities for trial in Middlesex or at 
the assizes and the burden imposed on jurors."' 1 The initial 
determination may subsequently be altered for " sufficient cause 
. . . without appeal from the former direction." ' There are 
no prescribed rules even as to what is prima facie desirable.'8 
The court is free to exercise an untrammelled discretion subject 
to a reversal only where it has been clearly abused. The I930 
Annual Practice lists only four cases in which an appeal was 
12 Foster v. Taylor, I T. R. 78i (0787). 
13 Evans v. Weaver, I Bos. & P. 20 (1797). 
14 Fenwick v. Farrow, I Chit. 334 (i8i9). 
15 Flecke v. Godfrey, a decision of Lord Mansfield, cited in Foster v. Taylor, 
I T. R. 78i, 782n.(a) (0787). 
16 Order 36, rule io, in ANNUAL PRACTICE (1930) 6o8. Until I902 plaintiff 
could choose the county subject to change by the court. Order 36, rule I, in STATU- 
TORY RULES AND ORDERS (I890) 75. 
17 Order 36, rule I, in ANNUAL PRACTICE (1930) 597. 
18 Possibly the line of least resistance in a close case would be to follow the 
common law rules of venue. In Foxwell v. Van Grutten, I4 T. L. R. I45 (i897), 
which affirms the order of the Judge in Chambers, Lord Justice Smith said that 
"prima facie the plaintiff was entitled to put the venue where he liked, and in an 
action of ejectment with regard to land at Cornwall prima facie Cornwall was 
the right place in which to try it." The initial weighting in favor of the plaintiff's 
choice may have disappeared with the revision in I902. See note i6, supra, 
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taken, the latest of which was decided in i906. In no case was 
the appeal successful.19 
The order directing the place of trial is made on the " sum- 
mons for directions," at which time it is also decided whether trial 
is to be with a special jury, with a common jury, or without a 
jury. Since the task of deciding these other questions involves 
inquiry as to the precise matters in dispute and the general char- 
acter of the testimony, there is comparatively little burden on 
court or parties to extend the inquiry to include the residence of 
witnesses and any other factors relevant to selecting the most con- 
venient place for trial. The high ability of English trial judges 
and masters and the confidence which they inspire make it pos- 
sible to settle the question satisfactorily, and with practical final- 
ity, in this simple, untechnical way. 
In the United States, the county of trial is largely regulated by 
statutes which are declaratory of the common law as to local 
actions, but more restrictive as to the plaintiff's choice when he is 
suing on a transitory action. A few generalizations are possible 
concerning these diverse restrictions. In almost every state there 
is some check which would prevent the plaintiff from selecting 
a remote county merely to embarrass the defendant. Attempt is 
made to approximate an appropriate initial designation by means 
of rules of thumb turning on the place where the cause arose, or 
on the residence of the defendant or of either party. In some 
states the plaintiff has an alternative choice of suing in the county 
where the defendant is served.20 There are special rules to take 
19 The cases are The Assyrian, 4 T. L. R. 694 (i888); Soley v. Lage, I2 T. L. R. 
i9i (i896); Foxwell v. Van Grutten, I4 T. L. R. I45 (i897); Thorogood v. 
Newman, 23 T. L. R. 97 (i906). Perhaps Powell v. Cobb, 29 Ch. D. 486 (i885), 
should be added. Objection to change of venue was included with other un- 
successful grounds of appeal. Only Thorogood v. Newman is subsequent to the 
I902 revision. In addition there is one reported case in which the trial judge 
expressed disapproval of the Master's order which had been objected to by one 
of the parties but was not appealed from. See Jones v. Consolidated Anthracite, 
Ltd., [i9i6] i K. B. I23, I3I. 
20 At common law defendant could be served anywhere in England regard- 
less of the venue. Some American states have restrictions requiring service to be 
in the county where the action is pending. Where this is true it is, of course, 
necessary to provide for trial where defendant is found. See MD. ANN. CODE 
(Bagby, I924) art. 75, ?? I57, I58, providing for service wherever defendant is 
found after a return non est in the county prescribed as normally appropriate for 
trial. In other states there is less clue to the motive for permitting suit where 
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care of particular types of litigation, such as actions on insur- 
ance contracts, or for personal injuries, and sometimes there are 
provisions that a suit on a contract may be brought in the county 
where it is to be performed. In addition, many states preserve 
the common law device of changing the venue for grounds in- 
cluding convenience of witnesses. The result is that the rules 
of thumb have only prima facie effect and are subject to discre- 
tionary modification wherever there is a balance of convenience 
in favor of some other county.21 
Such discretionary powers as are vested in the trial courts 
seem to be exercised satisfactorily. Seldom does an appellate 
court hold that there has been an abuse of discretion in grant- 
ing or denying a change of venue. The rules of thumb may give 
rise to questions of construction and to a resultant burden on ap- 
pellate courts, and may in some instances protract litigation. 
On the other hand they avoid the existence of an issue as to the 
proper place of trial in every case. It is doubtful whether we 
would be better off without any rules at all - unless we could 
transplant the entire English judicial system, including better 
paid, more independent, and more trusted trial judges, charged 
with ample discretionary powers as to all the details of practice. 
The danger that a plaintiff who mistakes his county may fall 
afoul of the Statute of Limitations or lose the advantage of at- 
tachments or garnishments can be obviated by providing that the 
defendant is found in view of modern provisions for leaving process at his resi- 
dence and in view of the general rule that process will run throughout the state 
as at common law. In some instances it may have been intended to protect the 
plaintiff from mistaking for defendant's home the place where defendant is. This 
of course is unnecessary where defendant may only move to change from a wrong 
to a proper county, and not to dismiss. See note 22, infra. 
21 See Appendix for summary of various statutes. Seventeen states have ex- 
press provisions for changing venue for convenience of witnesses, seven more for 
" cause," which, in view of the common law practice, probably includes con- 
venience of witnesses. Eighteen states have provisions which by implication ex- 
clude change on account of convenience of witnesses. In the other six states no 
provision was found. This may mean that the common law rules prevail. Or it 
may be the result of a necessarily hasty search in so many statute books with 
varying practices as to indexing. In thirty-two states there is a tendency to give 
defendant rather than plaintiff the advantage of trial at his home -except for 
special provisions permitting trial of certain actions where they arise. In only 
eleven is there clear evidence of preference for the plaintiff's convenience. In 
the other five states no clear statutory indication was found. 
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plaintiff's suing in the wrong county shall only give the def end- 
ant the right to change the venue by timely motion and will not 
result in a dismissal. Such legislation is in force in some fourteen 
states and has been recommended by Dean Pound and others for 
general adoption.22 
Whether we look to the common law, the modern English 
rules, or the American statutes governing the county of trial, we 
find nothing so irrational as the doctrine of local and transitory 
actions conventionally applied in the interstate field. There was 
no harm, for example, in the common law requirement that the 
venue of actions for trespass to land should be laid in the 
county where the land was, since this was usually the most con- 
venient place for trial and it involved no risk of leaving the plain- 
tiff without remedy anywhere.23 Whatever the venue require- 
ment, process might be served anywhere in England. Moreover, 
the requirement could be waived. Even in local actions the 
venue could be changed where necessary to secure an impartial 
trial.24 In the case of transitory actions we have seen that none 
of the systems gives the plaintiff an unrestricted choice which he 
may exercise with a view to vexing the defendant or getting be- 
fore whatever judge or type of jury is most likely to look favor- 
ably on his claim. Each system bears witness that in spite of the 
smaller geographic scale involved, the county of trial is important 
enough to warrant determination according to notions of con- 
22 The states are: California, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, Minnesota, New 
York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, 
and Wisconsin. See Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform (I9IO) 4 ILL. L. 
REV. 49I, 497. A similar advantage was urged as one of the reasons for a state's 
adoption of a unified system of courts. See a committee report signed by Everett 
P. Wheeler, chairman, Roscoe Pound, Charles F. Amidon, Joseph Henry Beale, 
Frank Irvine, Samuel C. Eastman, William E. Mikell, Henry D. Estabrook, 
Edward T. Sanford, Charles E. Littlefield, Charles S. Hamlin, Charles B. Elliott, 
George Turner, John D. Lawson, William L. January. (i9i7) I J. Am. JUD. Soc. 
101, I04. 
23 Cf. Livingston v. Jefferson, Fed. Cas. No. 8,4II (D. Va. i8ii), discussed in 
the writer's previous article, Place of Trial in Civil Actions (1930) 43 HARV. L. 
REV. 1217, M2g9. 
24 Compare Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., I58 U. S. I05 (0895), where the 
point that an action for trespass to land was tried in the wrong state was first 
raised by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the action dismissed on this 
ground. The record indicates the point was not taken below. Nor was it men- 
tioned in the briefs. See criticism of this case in SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRO- 
CEDURE 24-30. 
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venience. The variations are only as to the extent of the discre- 
tion left to the trial judge, and as to whether plaintiff's or de- 
fendant's convenience is to be preferred where a choice must be 
made. Except in the American states which do not recognize 
convenience of witnesses as a ground for change of venue, it is 
possible to settle the question after the parties are at issue and 
after a preliminary inquiry as to the testimony which they will 
need. 
II 
Are there any insuperable obstacles to a comparable handling 
of the interstate problem? One is provincialism. There is al- 
ways a danger that courts will be less concerned with doing jus- 
tice between the parties before them than in vindicating local 
interests at the expense of foreigners.25 We may have advanced 
beyond some of the cruder manifestations of this spirit, but it 
exerts a subtle influence on close cases, making courts reluctant 
to reexamine traditional premises where there is resulting hard- 
ship only to non-residents or foreign corporations, making them 
strike somewhat different balances between competing interests 
of plaintiff and defendant according to which one happens to be 
a resident. A similar psychological factor is the tendency to over- 
emphasize symmetrical development of principles when they are 
applied to situations not likely to recur with frequency. These 
factors are largely subconscious. As modern conditions increas- 
ingly force courts to consider the effect of their rulings as to the 
state of trial, they are less likely than heretofore to be ruled 
by artificial dogma and chauvinistic complexes. 
A more practical obstacle to applying the intrastate analogy is 
that the issue as to the state of trial must be presented to indi- 
vidual states which can speak only for themselves and can not be 
certain that another state will follow what they believe to be the 
proper doctrine of international law. If a court in state A dis- 
misses the action on the ground that state B is the proper state 
for trial, can it be sure that courts in state B will not also refuse 
25 See Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485, 499 (1853), quoted in Blair, The 
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law (I929) 29 COL. L. 
REV. I, 7, n. 35: "That country is undutiful and unfaithful to its citizens, which 
sends them out of its jurisdiction to seek justice elsewhere." 
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to entertain it? Will the plaintiff lose the advantage of attach- 
ment liens or of his having " found " an elusive defendant, or will 
the Statute of Limitations be set up, in case he is forced to begin 
over again in another state? The court in state A can not, as in 
the intrastate situation, simply order a transfer of the action to 
state B so that there will be a continuation of the same action. 
There is no procedure for attaching property or debts on mesne 
process in aid of an action in another state. It is submitted that 
these obstacles are only superficial and can easily be avoided with 
a little ingenuity in adapting to this situation machinery with 
which our courts are familiar in other connections- the condi- 
tional decree in equity and the granting of a discretionary common 
law motion on such terms as seem equitable. 
Assuming that the plaintiff has begun an action in a place which 
on the whole does not seem convenient, the question should be 
not whether he is to be penalized by a dismissal, but whether the 
ends of justice might better be served by trial elsewhere, and on 
what terms. This will make it possible, as in the case of motions 
for change of venue, to ascertain just what is the issue and 
what testimony will be needed, before deciding whether or not 
the court should entertain the action. The dismissal may then 
be conditional on the defendant's stipulating to admit service 
and waive all objections to proceeding in the state he con- 
tends is more appropriate, agreeing if necessary to waive the 
Statute of Limitations, and making such other stipulations as may 
be essential in order that the dismissal may operate for all practi- 
cal purposes as a change of venue to the other state. If property 
or debts have been attached and the court believes that the plain- 
tiff ought not to lose his lien, the defendant may be required to 
give bond to satisfy any judgment obtained in the other state. 
Delay incident to compelling the plaintiff to start again may be 
compensated for by requiring the defendant to cooperate in ex- 
pediting trial in the other state. He may be required to serve his 
answer in less than the time allowed. It might even be insisted 
that he waive a requirement of the foreign state as to the county 
for trial, and permit trial in an adjoining county which is about 
equally convenient but in which the case would be reached more 
promptly. It is not intended to urge that all or any of these con- 
ditions would be appropriate in every case. The amount of con- 
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cessions required of the defendant should depend upon how rea- 
sonable the plaintiff was in beginning his action where he did. 
The exact form of the order should be left to the sound discretion 
of the trial judge in meeting the infinitely varying situations 
which will come before him. 
Wherever there is the slightest danger of the defendant's suc- 
cessfully repudiating his stipulations in the foreign court, the 
initial court may, in lieu of dismissing the action, stay it sub- 
ject to appropriate conditions, including a stipulation permit- 
ting the summary entry of judgment in case the defendant re- 
sorts to obstructive tactics abroad. Or the stay may be used 
where there is any uncertainty as to what may be accom- 
plished in the foreign court even with the full cooperation of the 
defendant." 
A Pennsylvania statute 27 in force since i869 permits a some- 
what similar procedure when a non-resident plaintiff sues a resi- 
dent defendant and the defendant submits an affidavit that he has 
a just defense and that the witnesses live in the plaintiff's state. 
It calls for discontinuing the action upon delivery by the defend- 
ant of a power of attorney both to enter his appearance in the 
plaintiff's state and to confess judgment in any court in the 
United States for the amount recovered in the action in plaintiff's 
state, subject to the proviso that the action is not barred in that 
state at the time of the application to discontinue. While this 
statute is helpful so far as it goes, it illustrates vividly the futility 
of relying on specific legislation to regulate procedural problems 
of this sort. The legislation has all the earmarks of having been 
passed either to help a lawyer with influence in a specific case, or 
26 See Note (1930) 39 YALE L. J. ii96, advocating an analogous use of a con- 
ditional stay in certain situations involving concurrent litigation in two states, and 
citing some authority for granting a stay under circumstances in which a dismissal 
might be refused. 
As a matter of form counsel would doubtless feel safer in submitting their 
motion to dismiss or stay before the time for answering expires and before 
filing a formal answer, but including in their motion a specification of what 
will be their grounds of defense when required to answer in the court ulti- 
mately held to be appropriate. It is very doubtful, however, whether a court 
would be justified in insisting upon nice distinctions as to whether the motion 
precedes, accompanies, or follows a formal answer, provided that it is otherwise 
timely. 
27 PA. STAT. (West, I920) ? I7064. 
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to prevent a recurrence of what seemed an unreasonable handling 
of a single controversy. It suggests no broad consideration of re- 
lated problems. There is no provision for the situation where 
plaintiff and defendant are both non-residents,28 or for waiver of 
the Statute of Limitations if necessary, or for preserving equiva- 
lent advantages to a plaintiff who has attached property. If 
legislation is to be passed to deal with such cases it should be as 
general as possible and leave to the courts broad discretionary 
powers to do whatever may seem reasonable under the circum- 
stances. No matter how little dispute there is as to the desira- 
bility of such legislation, there is comparatively little chance of 
overcoming legislative inertia and securing its passage unless 
some accident happens to focus attention upon it. 
The best hope is that the courts will feel free to take appropri- 
ate action without specific legislation authorizing them to do so. 
It is submitted that authority for such action is implicit in well- 
established common law principles. The closest analogy is to 
change of venue on terms for the convenience of witnesses.29 
Many other instances suggest themselves, in which courts of law 
have felt free to attach conditions to discretionary orders - as in 
granting leave to amend,30 allowing the filing of a plea after de- 
28 Perhaps the statute implies that an unconditional dismissal would be ap- 
propriate where plaintiff and defendant both reside in the same state. What 
effect it would have where both are non-residents but of different states would 
depend on how far the courts will push the doctrine of expression unius exclusion al- 
terius. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 873, and 
Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," ibid. 886, 892. There may well be 
a difference between the attitude toward social legislation involving burning issues 
and that toward isolated tinkering with procedure. In the latter instance the most 
realistic assumption is that the legislature was dealing only with a specific case 
without thought of any wider application of the possible logical implications of the 
words used. The court should be free to use its own judgment as to the desirable 
rule in cases which fall just outside the language used. The danger that courts 
will not take this attitude is what makes the drafting of such legislation so 
perilous. 
29 See pp. 44-45, supra, for English cases. See also Carpenter v. Watrous, 5 
Wend. I02 (N. Y. i830); cf. Ellis v. Fitzpatrick, 3 Ind. T. 656, 64 S. W. 567 (i9oi). 
30 Knauth v. Heller, 68 Hun 570, 23 N. Y. Supp. io6 (i893) (permitting amend- 
ment denying agent's authority, conditioned on defendant's producing him for pre- 
liminary examination); Farmers Handy Wagon Co. v. Casualty Co. of America, i84 
Iowa 773, i67 N. W. 204, i69 N. W. I78 (i9i8) (requiring consent to withdrawal 
of stipulation waiving jury). See also (0930) 49 C. J. 544. 
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murrer overruled,3' allowing continuances,32 permitting the tak- 
ing33 or setting aside of a nonsuit,34 granting or denying a new 
trial,35 and so forth. The only controversy is as to what orders 
are discretionary and what terms are appropriate under particu- 
lar circumstances. These numerous analogies suggest that if 
there is a discretionary authority to dismiss actions brought in an 
inconvenient state, this discretion may be exercised subject to 
flexible conditions which will mitigate possible hardship on plain- 
tiffs and make the relief more generally available to defendants. 
III 
It seems generally recognized that there is a discretionary 
power to dismiss where the parties are aliens or foreign corpora- 
tions.36 Is this, like the common law correctives against an in- 
appropriate county, merely illustrative of a broad power of com- 
mon law courts to adapt their procedure to varying facts - or is 
it a survival of historic inhospitality to foreigners? 'The latter 
hypothesis seems scarcely tenable when we look to the exercise of 
31 Tefft v. McNoah, 9 Mich. 20I (i86i) (condition that defendant go to trial at 
the then term). 
32 Ames v. Webbers, io Wend. 575 (N. Y. I833) (condition that death shall not 
abate action). See also (19I7) I3 C. J. I92. 
33 Matter of Waverly Waterworks Co., 85 N. Y. 479 (i88i) (condition that 
plaintiff pay defendant's expenses). See also (i919) i8 C. J. ii68. 
34 See (i919) I8 C. J. I2I3. 
35 See (I928) 46 C. J. 4I8; SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE C. IV. In Mul- 
horn v. Public Serv. Trans. Co., I30 Atl. 5i6 (N. J. I925), it appeared that in a suit 
by a wife for her injuries and by her husband for consequent loss of services, the 
jury had allowed the husband damages for his own personal injuries. A new trial 
was ordered unless the plaintiff would amend so as to set up a claim for his own 
injuries, and thus bar himself from bringing another action. 
36 See The Belgenland, II4 U. S. 355 (I885), an admiralty suit growing out of a 
collision between a Norwegian and a Belgian ship. No American citizen was inter- 
ested. The Court held it for the discretion of the trial court to entertain jurisdiction 
or not, referring to a similar common law rule. II4 U. S. at 36i. Matthali v. Galit- 
zin, L. R. i8 Eq. 340 (1874); Robinson v. Kerr (I793), reported in note to Rea v. 
Hayden, 3 Mass. 25 (I807) (action on a contract made where the alien parties re- 
sided, not allowed); Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammerhill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 
iii N. E. 678 (I9I6); Discounto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, I27 Wis. 65I, io6 N. W. 
82i (I906), aff'd, 208 U. S. 570 (I908) (German corporation versus German in- 
dividual, as principal defendant, and Wisconsin garnishee); Great Western Ry. v. 
Miller, i9 Mich. 305 (I869). For other cases in which the principal was recog- 
nized, see Note (I924) 32 A. L. R. 6, 8. 
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the discretionary power. It does not result in unfair discrimina- 
tion against foreign plaintiffs; rather does it protect foreign de- 
fendants from unnecessary hardship. It is much more easily 
explained on procedural grounds alone. Where both the parties 
are foreigners there is a high probability that the local forum 
is inappropriate, and this warrants dismissal unless there are 
some special facts which make it reasonable to entertain the 
action. 
The same procedural considerations require the exercise of a 
like discretion where the plaintiff is a citizen of a sister state. 
Otherwise a visitor from a sister state may actually be subject 
to a risk from which the visiting alien is protected - the risk of a 
vexatious suit brought by a plaintiff who could easily have sued 
at their common domicil but who hopes to force a settlement by 
reaching him at a place where it would be highly inconvenient to 
defend. There is authority for this interpretation in the English 
and Scotch cases, which freely entertain the plea of forum non 
conveniens. Under this practice a Scotchman has been denied the 
right to sue a Scotch bank in England.37 The explanation for 
the doctrine given by the House of Lords is merely that it serves 
the ends of justice, not that a foreigner, much less a resident 
of the other kingdom, has an inferior standing in a court of 
Great Britain.38 
Unfortunately the close analogy between dismissing incon- 
venient actions by aliens or foreign corporations and actions by 
residents of other states, and the relation of both problems to the 
intrastate law of venue, have been obscured by loose talk as to the 
inferior status of non-citizens.39 This and Supreme Court dicta 
listing access to the courts in the several states as one of the 
privileges and immunities guaranteed to citizens of each state by 
Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, led many courts to de- 
cide that they had no power to dismiss an action by a resident of 
a sister state if they would entertain a similar action by a resident 
of their own state. It was assumed that a discrimination against 
37 Logan v. Bank of Scotland, [i906] I K. B. 14I. 
38 Socifte du Gaz de Paris v. Armateurs franqais, [I926] Sess. Cas. (H. L.) I3. 
39 See HENDERSON, POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITU- 
TIONAL LAW (i9i8) C. VI. See also Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto 
Exchange Corp., 262 U. S. 544 (I923). 
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non-residents was equivalent to a discrimination against citizens 
of other states.40 
The few cases upholding the power to dismiss were not carried 
beyond the state courts, and not until the recent case of Douglas v. 
New York, N. H. & H. R. R.4" was the question settled. This 
case upheld the New York practice making it discretionary 
whether to entertain an action by a non-resident against a foreign 
corporation.42 A brief examination of the antecedents of the 
case is necessary to understand both its constitutional implica- 
tions and its significance in the private law of the states which 
had previously deemed themselves hemmed in by a constitutional 
limitation. 
In reconciling the broad language of the privileges and im- 
munities clause with that measure of autonomy to which the 
several states were deemed entitled, at least three restrictive doc- 
trines have been evolved. First, that only certain privileges are 
protected -not including that of dredging for oysters,43 but, ac- 
cording to frequent reiteration, including the privilege of suing.44 
The second is that discriminations are permissible which are not 
hostile in character but are reasonably adapted to differences in 
situation between residents and non-residents.45 And finally it 
has been suggested that there is a distinction between residence 
and citizenship, and that a discrimination based on residence 
alone is not prohibited.46 A bald statement of the last makes it 
sound like an evasive quibble. It has been criticized as incon- 
sistent with the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment which 
makes citizens of the United States citizens of the state wherein 
40 See Blair, supra note 25; Notes (I928) 4I HARV. L. REV. 387; (I928) 37 YALE 
L. J. 983. 41 279 U. S. 377 (I929). 
42 See Murnan v. Wabash Ry., 246 N. Y. 244, I58 N. E. 508 (I927), for an ex- 
position of the New York practice. In the Douglas case it is referred to as statu- 
tory, but without specifying whether the statutes create or limit an otherwise 
broader power of dismissal. Which is the proper view was one of the points on 
which the Minnesota court divided in the Boright case, infra note 62. 
43 Corfield v. Coryell, Fed. Cas. No. 3,230 (E. D. Pa. i823); McCready v. 
Virginia, 94 U. S. 39I (i876). 
44 Corfield v. Coryell, supra note 43; Ward v. Maryland, I2 Wall. 4I8, 430 
(U. S. i870); Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 207 U. S. I42 (1907); Cana- 
dian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553 (I920). 
45 Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U. S. 72 (0876). 
46 See Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. R., i6 Ohio App. 37I, I40 N. E. 94 (I923). 
See also cases cited in note 48, infra. 
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they reside.47 It has been rejected in at least two cases, each hold- 
ing a particular discrimination against non-residents an uncon- 
stitutional discrimination in fact against citizens of other states.48 
So far as the Supreme Court is concerned, it has been used only 
where the discrimination was deemed reasonable.49 Possibly 
oysters can justly be reserved for citizens, including those who live 
abroad, and denied to persons who continue citizens of other 
states although in some sense local residents. But in the case of 
procedural regulations it would be difficult to find a reasonable 
basis for discrimination based on a citizenship not coinciding 
with residence. This suggests that the third formula may be only 
a somewhat more legalistic phrasing of the second.50 
Following one or the other of the formulae it had long been 
settled that there may be imposed on non-residents bringing or de- 
fending actions conditions which are not applied to residents - 
such as different periods of limitation,5" the filing of costs bonds,52 
and more summary liability to attachment.53 Doubtless there 
would have been no challenge to a requirement of venue compel- 
ling trial in the county nearest to the common domicil of non- 
resident litigants. But somehow a rule of jurisdiction confining 
them to the available domiciliary courts was not looked upon in 
the same light. Literal adherence to language of the Supreme 
47 See Meyers, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States 
(1903) i MiCE. L. REV. 286, 383, cited with approval by Blair, supra note 25, at I4, 
n. 70. 
48 Blake v. McClung, I72 U. S. 239, 247 (i898); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. 
CO., 252 U. S. 6o, 79 (I920) (holding that a taxing scheme " if it discriminates 
against all non-residents, has the necessary effect of including in the discrimination 
those who are citizens of other States; and, if there be no reasonable ground for 
the diversity of treatment, it abridges the privileges and immunities to which such 
citizens are entitled "). (Italics ours.) 
49 See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer in Blake v. McClung, 
I72 U. S. 239, 262 (i898); La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465 (1919). In 
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 539 (i9'9), the Court, having found no pro- 
tected privilege involved, held it unnecessary to decide whether the act in question 
could be sustained on the narrow ground that the discrimination was based on 
residence and not on citizenship. 
50 See (0930) 28 CALIF. L. REV. I59. 
51 Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U. S. 72 (i876); Canadian No. Ry. v. 
Eggen, 252 U. S. 553 (I920). 
52 See Blake v. McClung, I72 U. S. 239, 256 (i898). See also Ownbey v. 
Morgan, 256 U. S. 94 (I92I). 
53 Central Loan & Trust Co. v. Campbell, I73 U. S. 84 (i899). 
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Court, although uttered when neither the facts nor the general 
line of reasoning had anything to do with problems of venue, gave 
rise to the belief that whatever disparate conditions are imposed 
on the non-resident plaintiff, he must be left a substantially ade- 
quate remedy in the forum he has selected, regardless of the 
availability of the courts at his domicil. Emphasis is on the privi- 
lege of the plaintiff, not on the doing of justice between the 
parties.54 
This argument was advanced in the Douglas case,55 but is 
scarcely noticed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes.56 He 
confines himself to the somewhat nicer argument of the petitioner, 
which was, as he restates it, that " a citizen of New York is a resi- 
dent of New York wherever he may be living in fact, and thus 
all citizens of New York can bring these actions, whereas citizens 
of other States can not unless they are actually living in the 
State." 5 The Court answers this by assuming that the New 
York courts would apply their doctrine to residents in " the pri- 
mary sense of one actually living in New York," and then 
continues: 
" A distinction of privileges according to residence may be based 
upon rational considerations and has been upheld by this Court, empha- 
sizing the difference between citizenship and residence, in La Tourette v. 
McMaster, 248 U. S. 465. Followed in Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 
525, 539. ... There are manifest reasons for preferring residents in 
access to often overcrowded Courts, both in convenience and in the fact 
that broadly speaking it is they who pay for maintaining the Courts 
concerned." 58 
54 See State ex rel. Prall v. District Court of Waseca County, I26 Minn. 50I, I48 
N. W. 463 (1914). Apart from the mechanical building upon dicta of the Supreme 
Court, there would seem to be as little foundation for this argument as for a 
contention that the common statutes requiring trial in the county where one of 
the parties lives deny the equal protection of the laws. Under them the courts 
in a particular county may be open to residents of that county and yet under 
identical circumstances closed to residents of other counties. 
55 BRIEF FOR PETITIONER I9. 
56 The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Van Devanter, and Mr. Justice Butler dis- 
sented without opinion. 279 U. S. 377, 388 (I929). We are left in the dark 
whether they believed the New York practice unconstitutional or merely accepted 
the other point of the petitioner, that it could not be applied in cases arising under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
57 279 U. S. 377, 386. 58 Id. at 387. 
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In establishing the competency of state courts to dismiss ac- 
tions by non-residents when another forum is deemed more ap- 
propriate, the Douglas case furnishes no very clear criterion as to 
the limits, if any, on the exercise of discretion, nor even of the 
standards which should govern. In view of the availability of the 
home forum there was no question that the New York courts had 
reached a fair result as between the parties. This is evidently rec- 
ognized by the Supreme Court's reference to the " convenience " 
of the distinction drawn. But what is meant by the emphasis on 
crowded courts and the burdens on local taxpayers? 5 Are these 
factors considered relevant in themselves or only additional rea- 
sons for not doing an injustice to the foreign corporate defend- 
ant? It is submitted that once the plaintiff establishes the 
appropriateness of a particular forum as between himself and 
defendant, he should not be handicapped because he is not a local 
taxpayer, and that if his choice of forum is vexatious no amount 
of local tax-paying should purchase for him an undue advantage 
over the defendant. Under this view the non-resident plaintiff 
might claim a constitutional right to sue in a sister state which is 
substantially nearer his home than the defendant's, or at least 
that the court exercise jurisdiction unless the defendant submit to 
suit at the plaintiff's home. Perhaps a court free to exercise dis- 
cretion would allow the same remedies to a close neighbor as to 
one of its own citizens where the alternative was a remote forum,60 
and of course there is a certain margin of judgment which must 
be left to the state courts. The constitutional problem is most 
likely to arise in the event that the Douglas case should prove a 
stimulus for legislation dealing with non-resident litigants. A 
statute flatly excluding actions between non-residents would not 
59 The argument is taken from some of the state cases which had anticipated 
the constitutional holding of the Douglas case. They are cited with approval 
by Blair, supra note 25, at 25. In the state courts the argument may have been 
thrown out as a sop to local patriots who might otherwise be distressed by the 
failure to harass a foreign corporation. There is perhaps one situation where the 
effect on trial calendars might properly influence the court's discretion. It would 
refute an attempt by the plaintiff to justify his choice of an otherwise inappropri- 
ate forum because he could get to trial there more quickly than at home. A 
state's efforts to expedite local justice should not be thwarted by compelling it to 
carry the burdens of more backward neighbors. 
60 See Murnan v. Wabash Ry., supra note 42, and subsequent disposal of the 
case in 222 App. Div. 833, 226 N. Y. Supp. 393 (I928). 
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only operate unfairly in certain instances, but might also be held 
unconstitutional. 
The most interesting question suggested by the Douglas case 
is what will happen in the states which have thus far felt a con- 
stitutional compulsion to entertain vexatious suits by plaintiffs 
who are citizens of other states. Will they now feel free to treat 
questions as to the state of trial as sensibly as they do questions 
as to the county of trial, and will they regard citizens of sister 
states as no more entitled to abuse their processes than aliens 
and foreign corporations? This question was raised recently in 
Minnesota in the case of Boright v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R.62 
The case was recognized as of great importance. Numerous coun- 
sel filed briefs as amici curiae - representatives of railroads and, 
on the plaintiff's side, counsel for labor unions and counsel whose 
interest is not stated of record. These last, one may infer, were 
interested as frequently appearing for non-resident plaintiffs in 
personal injury cases. The victory was for the, personal injury 
racket - not, however, without a vigorous dissent. Thriving 
under a highly organized and thus far judicially tolerated system 
of ambulance chasing, and the old beliefs as to the effect of the 
privileges and immunities clause, the spectacle of vexatiously im- 
ported litigation has long been familiar in Minnesota. The ma- 
jority opinion in the Boright case suggests that judges are perhaps 
becoming callous to it.63 It seemed that the common law power 
61 Cf. S. C. CODE CIV. PROC. (I922) ? 744; construction given similar provision 
of North Carolina Code in Ledford v. Western Union Tel. Co., I79 N. C. 63, IOI 
S. E. 533 (i9i9); and former provision of New York Code involved in Robinson 
v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., II2 N. Y. 3I5, i9 N. E. 625 (1889). See also Loftus 
v. Pennsylvania Ry., supra note 46. 
62 230 N. W. 457 (Minn. I930); see similar view advanced as alternate ground 
in Herrmann v. Franklin Ice Cream Co., II4 Neb. 468, 208 N. W. I4I (I926). 
Boright was an employee of defendant living in Kansas and injured there. De- 
fendant was an Illinois corporation having a substantial part of its railroad sys- 
tem in Minnesota and there engaged in intrastate as well as interstate commerce. 
Defendants also asked for dismissal to avoid a burden on interstate commerce. 
This plea was denied, following earlier Minnesota cases, on the ground that the 
objection under the commerce clause does not apply to a railroad operating part 
of its system within the state. This is a point still open under the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court. See Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions (I930) 
43 HARV. L. REV. I2I7, I232. 
63 See authorities referred to by Stone, J., in his dissenting opinion, 230 N. W. 
457, 464. 
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to adapt procedure to prevent its abuse had atrophied from dis- 
use, and the court found on non-constitutional grounds that it was 
powerless to dismiss such suits.64 Instead of regretting this situa- 
tion, it glorified the Minnesota law for its hospitality to strangers, 
thus indicating that it was still thinking in terms of a philosophy 
which assimilates a would-be litigant to a laborer or business man 
entitled to a free opportunity to try his luck in whatever state 
he chooses. Compelled by the United States Supreme Court to 
abandon any constitutional sanction for this theory, the majority 
of the Court still stubbornly adheres to it as determining at least 
the domestic policy of the state. The decision is hardly one to 
commend itself for general acceptance. 
IV 
This is a theoretical, academic treatment. Its purpose ends 
with pointing out indisputable abuses, analyzing the various lines 
of legal development which have resulted from efforts to cope 
with them, and recommending the exercise of a discretionary 
power of dismissal, subject to conditions safeguarding the inter- 
ests of plaintiffs, both as the only adequate solution and as in ac- 
cord with the most vital traditions of common law development. 
Theoretical analysis can show how closely related this is to prac- 
tice that has worked successfully in choosing the place of trial 
both on the smaller intrastate scale and on the larger interna- 
tional scale, and which is generally conceded to be appropriate 
for deciding in what state a corporation may sue. The academic 
writer can not hope to furnish assistance in the practical prob- 
lems which will rise in the exercise of discretion.65 These must 
64 The dicta cited for this position do not seem very compelling. As a matter 
of purely formal logic the dissenting opinion seems more convincing. One wonders 
whether the majority of the court would have found the earlier dicta so persuasive 
in case the issue had been whether to open rather than to keep open the door to 
vexatious litigation. 
65 Blair, supra note 25, at 20, analyzes the cases to show the practical function- 
ing of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In addition, some help may be de- 
rived from cases passing on the exercise of discretion by trial courts to change the 
venue for convenience of witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, I47 Wash. 
690, 267 Pac. 503 (I928) (change prevented by admissions); Wakpala State Bank v. 
Tackett, 50 S. D. 385, 2i0 N. W. ij9 (I926) (refusal of change where purpose 
was to re-litigate point already settled); Bell v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 3 
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be left to the experience and sound judgment of the courts, par- 
ticularly of trial courts. There need be little fear that they will 
abuse a discretion frankly recognized as such. The danger is 
always lest an illusory quest for certainty lead them to predicate 
mechanical rules on the solutions deemed advisable in a few of 
the more common cases, thus turning a simple practical problem 
into a complicated mystery.66 
Roger S. Foster. 
YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW. 
Green 63 (N. J. i835) (venue changed to be near bank's books, removal of which 
would have interrupted public business of the bank); Belding v. Archer, I3i N. C. 
287, 42 S. E. 800 (I902) (court influenced by relative promptness of trial in two 
possible counties). See also pp. 44-45, supra. The case of American Historical Soc. 
v. Glenn, 248 N. Y. 445, 453, i62 N. E. 48I, 483-84 (I928), suggests the desirabil- 
ity of caution against hasty generalizations based on the interests of either plain- 
tiffs or defendants alone. The court said " It is a great and fundamental privilege 
of defendants to have small causes brought in local courts heard in their own terri- 
tory." Cf. N. Y. C. P. A. (I920) ? I82, giving plaintiff a prima facie right to sue in 
his own county if he chooses; and see note 21, supra, for differences in statutes de- 
termining the county according to whether plaintiff's or defendant's convenience 
should prevail. 
66 Contract actions are less likely than tort to require transportation of 
numerous witnesses, and perhaps more likely to involve pursuing an evasive debtor. 
Hence there is less occasion for the exercise of discretion to dismiss. It is obvious, 
however, that this generalization is subject to exception. Compare dicta in New 
York that the discretionary power exists only in tort cases. These dicta were 
accepted as settling the state law by Thatcher, J., in Pantswowe Zaklady Graviozne 
v. Automobile Ins. Co., 36 F.(2d) 504, 5o6 (S. D. N. Y. I928), (0930) 43 HARV. 
L. REV. II57. See Blair, supra note 25, at 30. 
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APPENDIX 
For each state the first citation is to the provision for venue; the second 
to the provision for change of venue. The phrase " for prejudice " is used 
to cover objections to both court and jury; reference to this ground is made 
only where there is no legislative provision which in terms includes change 
for convenience of witnesses. 
Alabama. CODE (Michie, I928) ? I0467 (defendant's county; in non- 
contract actions, alternative where action or omission occurred). Ibid. 
? I0476 (for prejudice). 
Arizona. CODE (Struckmeyer, I928) ? 37I5 (defendant's county; excep- 
tions include alternative where contract was to be performed). Ibid. ? 37I8 
(convenience of witnesses). 
Arkansas. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, I92I) ? II76 (defendant's 
county). Ibid. ?? I0339, I034I (for prejudice; other grounds expressly 
excluded). 
California. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, I923) ?? 392, 395 (defendant's 
county or where personal injury occurred). Ibid. ?? 396, 397 (to correct 
wrong designation and for convenience of witnesses). 
Colorado. See Maxwell Chamberlain Co. v. Piatt, 65 Colo. I40, I73 Pac. 
867 (i9i8) (defendant's county or where contract was to be performed). 
COMP. LAWS (I92I) ? 66I6 (for prejudice). 
Connecticut. GEN. STAT. (i9i8) ? 5563 (plaintiff's or defendant's county). 
No general provision found for change of venue. Cf. ibid. ?? 557I, 558i. 
Delaware. No statutes regulating venue or change. See REV. CODE 
(19I5) ??H478, 4I79 (regulations of pleading which imply common law 
rules of venue prevail). 
Florida. COMP. LAWS (I927) ? 42I9 (defendant's county or where cause 
accrued or property in question is located). Ibid. ? 4335 et seq. (for preju- 
dice; no change to a county where either party resides, except by consent). 
Georgia. POL. CODE ANN. (I926) ? 5526 et seq. (defendant's county). 
Ibid. ? 5532 et seq. (for prejudice). 
Idaho. COMP. STAT. (I9I9) ?? 666i, 6664 (defendant's county or, in in- 
surance cases, place of death or loss). Ibid. ?? 6665-66 (for convenience 
of witnesses or to correct wrong designation). 
Illinois. REV. STAT. (Cahill, I929) c. I46, ? I (defendant's county or 
where found, or, in insurance cases, plaintiff's county). Ibid. ?? 6, 7 (for 
prejudice). 
Indiana. ANN. STAT. (Burns, I926) ? 329 (defendant's county). Ibid. 
? 442 (convenience of witnesses). 
Iowa. CODE (I927) ?? II038, II043, II049 (defendant's county or where 
contract was to be performed or where insured loss occurred). Ibid. ?? II039, 
II053, II408 (for prejudice or to correct wrong designation). 
Kansas. REV. STAT. ANN. (I923) c. 6o, ? 509 (defendant's county). Ibid. 
? 5II (for prejudice). 
Kentucky. Civ. CODE (Carroll, I927) ? 78 (defendant's county or where 
served). STAT. (Carroll, I930) ? I094 et seq. (for prejudice). 
Louisiana. No provision for venue found. REV. CODE OF PRAC. (Marr, 
I927) p. 3I8 (change of venue for cause). 
Maine. REV. STAT. (I916) c. 86, ? 9 (county where either party lives). 
Jbid. c. 87, ? 25 (for cause), 
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Maryland. ANN. CODE (Bagby, I924) art. 75, ? I57 (defendant's county 
unless return non est). Ibid. ? io9 (for prejudice). 
Massachusetts. GEN. LAWS (I92I) C. 223, ?? I, 7 (where any party lives 
or does business, except that personal injury actions must be brought where 
plaintiff lives or injury was received). No provision for change of venue 
found. 
Michigan. COMP. LAWS (19I5) ?? I2340, I234I (where either party 
lives). Ibid. ? I234I (for cause). 
Minnesota. STAT. (Mason, I927) ? 9214 (defendant's county). Ibid. 
?? 92I5, 92i6 (convenience of witnesses and to correct wrong designation). 
Mississippi. ANN. CODE (Hemingway, I927) ? 500 (defendant's county 
or where found; if defendant is a corporation, also where cause occurred). 
Ibid. ? 505 (resident individual may change to county where he lives; other- 
wise, for prejudice). 
Missouri. REV. STAT. ANN. (I919) ? II77 (defendant's county, or plain- 
tiff's county if defendant is found there). Ibid. ? I357 (for prejudice). 
Montana. REV. CODE (Choate, I92I) ? 9096 (defendant's county, or 
plaintiff's county if defendant is found there). Ibid. ?? 9097, 9098 (to cor- 
rect wrong designation or for convenience of witnesses). 
Nebraska. COMP. STAT. (I922) ? 8563 (where defendant lives or is 
found). Ibid. ? 8564 (for prejudice). 
Nevada. REV. LAWS (I9I2) ?? 50I2-I4 (where defendant lives). Ibid. 
? 50I5 (for convenience of witnesses or to correct wrong designation). 
New Hampshire. PUB. LAWS (I926) C. 328, ? I (where party resides). 
Ibid. ? 3 (" when justice or convenience requires it "). 
New Jersey. COMP. STAT. (19IO) P. 4II3, ? 202 (where cause arose or 
where plaintiff or defendant lives, subject to court's discretion). Ibid. ? 203 
(for cause). 
New Mexico. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, I929) C. I47, ? IOI (where any 
party lives or cause originated, or county where defendant is found if in 
judicial district of his residence). Ibid. ? Io5 (for prejudice). 
New York. C. P. A. (I920) ? I82 (where a party lives). Ibid. ?? i86, 
I87 (to correct a wrong designation or for convenience of witnesses). 
North Carolina. CODE ANN. (Michie, I927) ? 469 (where a party lives). 
Ibid. ? 470 (for convenience of witnesses). 
North Dakota. COMP. LAWS ANN. (19I3) ? 74I7 (defendant's county). 
Ibid. ? 74I8 (for convenience of witnesses or to correct wrong designation). 
Ohio. CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, I930) ? II277 (where defendant lives 
or is served). Ibid. ? II4I5 (for prejudice). 
Oklahoma. COMP. STAT. ANN. (Bunn, I92I) ? 207 (where defendant lives 
or is served). Ibid. ? 208 (for prejudice). 
Oregon. LAWS ANN. (Olson, I920) ? 44 (where defendant lives or is 
served). Ibid. ? 45 (for convenience of witnesses or to correct wrong desig- 
nation). 
Pennsylvania. STAT. (I920) ? I7069 et seq. (except in actions for tres- 
pass to land, regulation of process rather than venue limits suit to county 
where service can be had). Ibid. ?? I7268, I7274 (for prejudice and where 
there would otherwise be more than six months' delay in getting to trial). 
Rhode Island. GEN. LAWS (I923) ? 4850 (where either party lives or 
defendant is served). No provision for change of venue. 
South Carolina. CIv. CODE (I922) ? 378 (defendant's county). Ibid. 
? 382 (for convenience of witnesses or to correct wrong designation). 
South Dakota. COMP. LAWS (I929) ? 2327 (defendant's county; in cer- 
tain tort cases, where cause arose). Ibid. ? 2328 (for convenience of wit- 
nesses or to correct wrong designation). 
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Tennessee. See Haynes v. Woods, I5i Tenn. i63, 268 S. W. 632 (I925) 
(where either party lives). ANN. CODE (Shannon, i9i8) ? 5720 (for preju- 
dice). 
Texas. See City of Tahoka v. Jackson, II5 Tex. 89, 276 S. W. 662 (I925) 
(where defendant lives or contract was to be performed). CoMP. STAT. 
(I928) p. 284, art. 2I70 (for cause). 
Utah. COMP. LAWS (19I7) ?? 6528-3I (where a party lives or cause arose). 
Ibid. ?? 6532-33 (for convenience of witnesses or to correct wrong desig- 
nation). 
Vermont. GEN. LAWS (19I7) ? I782 (where a party lives). Ibid. ? I784 
(for prejudice). 
Virginia. GEN. LAWS (I923) ?? 6049-50 (where defendant lives or cause 
arose). Ibid. ? 6I75 (for cause). 
Washington. COMP. STAT. (Remington, I922) ? 207 (where defendant 
lives or is served). Ibid. ?? 208, 209 (for convenience of witnesses or to 
correct wrong designation). 
West Virginia. CODE ANN. (Barnes, I923) p. 2I38, C. I23, ?? I, 2 (where 
defendant lives or cause arose). No provision found for change of venue. 
Wisconsin. STAT. (I927) ? 26i.oi (where defendant lives). Ibid. 
?? 26i.03, 26i.04 (for convenience of witnesses or to correct wrong designa- 
tion). 
Wyoming. COMP. STAT. ANN. (I920) C. 358, ? 56i8 (where defendant 
lives or is served). Ibid. p. II44, c. 394, ? 64I9 (for convenience of wit- 
nesses). 
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